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Abstract
This paper studies the welfare implications of using market mechanisms to
allocate transmission capacity in recently liberalized electricity markets. It
questions whether access to this essential facility should be traded on a mar-
ket, or whether the incumbent should retain exclusive usage rights. We show
that granting exclusive use to the incumbent might be optimal, if the capacity
of the essential facility is small and the incumbent can reduce production costs
by taking advantage of interregional production-cost diﬀerences. This result
counters the intuition that arbitrage will improve the social surplus when there
is no output contraction. The reason is that when competition is imperfect,
arbitrage might reduce production eﬃciency. We advise policymakers to in-
troduce market mechanisms for the allocation of transmission capacity only if
suﬃcient investment in the network is ensured or if the market power of the
incumbent is broken in at least one of the markets in which it is active.
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11 Introduction
The electricity sector has been subject to major structural changes during the last
decade. Liberalization policies all over the world have led to a separation of for-
merly vertically integrated monopolies into three parts: production, retail and net-
work services. Competition has been introduced at the production- and retail levels,
although most markets remain highly concentrated and incumbent ﬁrms often con-
tinue to be dominant. Competition at the level of network services is not feasible,
as it is ineﬃcient to build and operate multiple parallel networks. These network
assets are therefore essential facilities whose eﬃcient allocation is crucial for a well-
functioning upstream (production) and downstream (retail) market. Regulation
generally requires that access to the essential facility be organized in such a way
that it is non-discriminatory and market-conform. This implies that price arbitrage
becomes possible, and that it is harder for the incumbent generation ﬁrm to price
discriminate. This paper studies the welfare eﬀect of a change towards a more
market-conform allocation of essential facilities in the electricity sector, while at the
same time keeping market structure (ownership) constant.
The classical industrial organization models of third-degree price discrimination sug-
gest that arbitrage generally improves welfare, as long as the incumbent does not
signiﬁcantly restrict supply in response to arbitrage. We show that these models
cannot be applied to the electricity sector, as they do not allow for production-
cost diﬀerences across regions in combination with limited transportation capac-
ity. Marginal production costs for electricity vary greatly across regions because of
political constraints (for instance, acceptance of nuclear power plants), geographi-
cal constraints (wind- and water power production) and diﬀerences in demand-side
characteristics.1 Moreover, transmission lines connecting electricity regions are often
1Demand aﬀects marginal production costs in two ways. Demand characteristics determine
the equilibrium portfolio of production plants in a region. Regions might have demand peaks at
2congested, as they were not designed to handle commercial trading activities, but to
transport emergency power.2 Once these aspects are correctly taken into account,
arbitrage is more likely to decrease welfare compared to the outcome in the standard
price-discrimination model.
In the electricity market, transmission capacity allows for two functions: it en-
ables both price arbitrage by consumers and production-cost minimization by the
monopolist. It is the interaction of these two (sometimes conﬂicting) functions of
transmission capacity which have led to the counter-intuitive welfare results of our
paper.
In the absence of price arbitrage, the monopolist will use the entire transmission
capacity and shift as much of its production as possible to the low-cost region.
Production costs are minimized, and the monopolist uses regional price discrimina-
tion. As there is no competition for accessing the transmission line, the price for
transmission is zero.
In the presence of arbitrage, arbitrageurs trade electricity from the low price- to the
high-price region. In the high-price region, the incumbent generator loses market
share to the arbitrageurs and therefore lowers the price. In the low-price region, he
gains market size and raises the price. Hence, arbitrage reduces the price diﬀerential.
Apart from a possible eﬀect on total supply, the welfare eﬀect of a reduction of
the regional price diﬀerence consists of two parts: it improves allocational eﬃciency
among consumers, and it decreases production eﬃciency, as relatively more will be
produced in the high-cost region. We show that it is likely that the negative ef-
fect outweighs the positive one. The introduction of market mechanisms for the
diﬀerent moments in time, which means that regions might be operating on diﬀerent parts of their
supply function. Marginal production costs range from 0 EUR/MWh for nuclear power plants and
some water plants, to 30 EUR/MWh for gas and coal plants, and more than 100 EUR/MWh for
peak-power plants (i.e. plants with low ﬁxed costs and high marginal costs).
2This can be illustrated for the UCTE system, the world largest synchronously interconnected
electricity system, covering 23 European countries. Of the 39 cross-border connections, 24 are
congested more than 75% of the time, and only ﬁve connections are never congested.
3allocation of essential facilities (e.g. auctioning) therefore makes sense only in the
following situations: (1) when suﬃcient investment is made in transmission capac-
ities or (2) when the market power of the incumbent is broken in at least one of
the two markets. If transmission capacity is suﬃciently large, then regional cost
diﬀerences do not matter, and arbitrage eliminates the incumbent’s ability to price
discriminate. Furthermore, more competitive markets eliminate the conﬂict between
allocational and production eﬃciency, and arbitrage improves both.
The results of this paper are highly relevant for evaluating the market-coupling
projects in Europe. These projects are meant to further integrate electricity mar-
kets and to improve cross-border arbitrage. For instance, the Dutch and the Belgian
power exchanges have been coupled since November 2006, improving arbitrage be-
tween the countries. The stylized model we develop in this paper ﬁts this market
coupling nicely: Production costs are very diﬀerent between the two countries due to
diﬀerences in past energy policies: Belgium produces 55% nuclear, while the Nether-
lands relies more on gas production (it is a gas exporter) and combined heat- and
power generation. The transmission capacity between Belgium and the Netherlands
is limited and congested about 30% of the time. One ﬁrm is in a dominant position
both in Belgium and in the Netherlands: Electrabel has a market share of about
80% in Belgium, and 20% in the Netherlands. The results of our paper predict that
when the transmission line is congested (30% of the time), total welfare is reduced.3
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on third-
degree price discrimination. In Section 3, we present a simple example highlighting
the role of production-cost diﬀerences. Section 4 describes the model and explains
how transmission capacity is allocated with and without arbitrage. Section 5 dis-
cusses, for diﬀerent allocation mechanisms, the behavior of the monopolist. The
3This is the case under the assumption that the price-cost markup is larger in Belgium than in
the Netherlands, a reasonable assumption given the fact that the incumbent generator in Belgium
has a quasi monopoly.
4paper concludes with a discussion of the welfare eﬀects of arbitrage.
2 Literature review
This paper discusses regional price discrimination in electricity markets. Third-
degree price discrimination occurs when a monopolist is able to charge diﬀerent
prices to diﬀerent markets or groups of consumers for a homogeneous good. The
standard price discrimination model, where trade is costless and production costs
are uniform, has been studied extensively in the literature. In this section we review
this literature and show that the results do not always hold for the electricity sec-
tor, which is characterized by interregional production-cost diﬀerences and limited
transmission capacity.
One of the main insights in the literature (Tirole, 1988) is that the welfare eﬀect
of arbitrage is the combination of two eﬀects: an allocational eﬀect and an output
eﬀect. Costless arbitrage guarantees equal prices across regions as consumers take
advantage of any interregional price diﬀerence. Therefore, trade among consumers
results in an eﬃcient allocation of the good, given that the marginal valuation of
an additional unit is the same across consumers. This is the allocational eﬀect of
arbitrage. At the same time, the monopolist may react by increasing or decreasing
total output under the eﬀect of arbitrage. This is the output eﬀect. A positive
output eﬀect increases welfare. The total welfare eﬀect is the sum of both eﬀects:
arbitrage increases allocational eﬃciency, but at the same time it might induce a
strategic response of the monopolist, thereby decreasing output eﬃciency.
For linear demand (and constant marginal production costs), Robinson (1933) shows
that the output eﬀect is zero. In this case, price discrimination should be forbidden,
as output is not allocated eﬃciently. Also for the linear demand case, Layson (1988)
shows graphically that price discrimination is most harmful for society when it is
5most proﬁtable for the monopolist, as the welfare loss is proportional to the proﬁt
gain from price discrimination4. Results are less clear-cut for non-linear demand.
However, if the output eﬀect can be shown to be positive, then the welfare eﬀect will
be positive. Robinson (1933) shows that in the standard price-discrimination model
the output eﬀect of arbitrage depends on the curvature of the two demand curves.
She shows that when demand is convex in the high-priced market and concave in
the low-priced market, the output eﬀect is positive. Also, if both curves are strictly
concave, the output eﬀect is positive when the low-priced market is more concave5.
Arbitrage might increase welfare even when the output eﬀect is negative. In the
literature there are no simple guidelines as to the total welfare eﬀect of arbitrage.
Total welfare eﬀects of price discrimination (with no distinction made between the
output- and allocational eﬀect) were studied by Varian (1985), who derives upper and
lower bounds of the eﬀect of price discrimination in terms of changes in market prices
and output. Malueg (1993) quantiﬁes the relative size of the welfare change caused
by third-degree price discrimination. For concave demand functions, he shows, for
instance, that with price discrimination, welfare will never decrease more than 33%
and never increase more than 150%.
Our paper shows that the results of the standard literature on third-degree price
discrimination cannot always be applied to the electricity sector. The diﬀerences
and similarities with the classical model are the following:
4Schmalensee (1981) generalizes this result for n independent markets with arbitrary demand
function curvatures and constant marginal costs. He shows that a necessary but not suﬃcient con-
dition for social welfare-improving price-discrimination is that total output increases compared to
the non-discriminatory situation. In particular, prohibiting price discrimination is always welfare-
increasing for linear demand, as total quantity remains unchanged in both regimes.




where p(q) is the inverse demand function. Robinson’s criterion for determining the output eﬀect
is derived for inﬁnitesimally small price changes. For large price changes, Shih et al. (1988) derive
more general conditions for the sign of the total output eﬀect.
6We demonstrate that the welfare eﬀect of arbitrage is the combination of three
factors. As in the standard model, there is an allocational eﬀect and an output
eﬀect, but there is also a new eﬀect: the production eﬃciency eﬀect, which requires
that the goods are produced in the low-cost region. Arbitrage will typically improve
allocational eﬃciency, but will reduce production eﬃciency.
With linear demand functions, we derive that the output eﬀect of arbitrage is zero,
but that arbitrage will not always increase welfare. Arbitrage decreases welfare
when production cost diﬀerences are larger than the diﬀerence in the consumers’
willingness to pay (the regional price diﬀerence).
With concave demand functions, adjusted concavity determines the output eﬀect.
For transmission capacities close to zero, arbitrage increases total output when the
demand in the low-price region is more concave than in the high-price region, where
concavity is measured as in Robinson (1933). Hence, the sign of the output eﬀect is
identical to that in the standard third-degree price-discrimination model.
Finally, instead of deﬁning upper- and lower bounds for welfare changes, we derive
suﬃcient conditions for a positive welfare eﬀect of arbitrage. These conditions de-
pend on a combination of the curvature of the demand functions (which determines
the output eﬀect), the elasticity of the demand functions (which determines the
regional deadweight loss) and the price-cost margin (which links allocational and
production eﬃciency).
The discussion in our paper is linked to two strands of literature. The ﬁrst concerns
the presence of imperfect arbitrage in models with price discrimination. The second
deals with the abuse of market power in electricity markets.
Several authors have introduced imperfect arbitrage in price-discrimination models.
When there are transaction costs or when goods are not perfectly homogeneous,
arbitrage might lead to “leakage” of products from one market to another without
7eliminating the price diﬀerence completely. The monopolist can charge diﬀerent
prices in both regions, but if there is a price diﬀerence, then some of his production
will leak from the low-priced region to the high-priced region. In this context,
Varian (1985) derives a general model where sales by the monopolist might depend
on the prices charged in both regions. Wright (1993) looks at a special type of
imperfect arbitrage: arbitrageurs have to pay a ﬁxed arbitrage cost. Ahmadi and
Yang (2000) look at a model where arbitrage is imperfect because consumers value
the sales of the monopolist (the authorized seller) higher than they value the goods
from the arbitrageurs (unauthorized re-seller, parallel importer). This could be the
result of diﬀerent packaging or warranty conditions, for example. They show that
in that case, it might be proﬁtable for the monopolist to have some arbitrage, as
it helps him to price discriminate consumers on the basis of their valuation of the
(perceived) quality of the goods. Our paper is diﬀerent from this literature, as we
look at imperfect arbitrage that is caused by limited transmission capacity combined
with regional production-cost diﬀerences.
The current paper contributes to the discussion in the electricity sector on the in-
teraction between transmission and energy markets. Joskow and Tirole (2000) and
Gilbert et al. (2003) model the microstructure of the transmission-rights market.
Assuming that the transmission line is always congested, they show that the auction
design determines whether arbitrage is perfect or not. Each type of auction therefore
has a diﬀerent impact on welfare. The focus of our current paper is diﬀerent. While
they assume generators to be located at one end of the line, we assume production
capacity at both ends, which allows us to understand the eﬀect of production-cost
diﬀerences. We do not study auction design, however, as we consider only two ex-
treme cases namely, perfect arbitrage and no arbitrage. Borenstein et al. (2000)
discuss a Cournot generation duopoly. They assume that each player has produc-
tion in one of the regions, and that arbitrage is perfect. Insuﬃcient transmission
8capacity decreases the competition in electricity market. Our paper is diﬀerent, as
we study the impact of arbitrage.
A long-term version of our model, where new transmission capacity can be built at
a ﬁxed long-term marginal investment cost, is studied by Willems (2004).
3 Numerical example
A well-known result on third-degree price discrimination is that for linear demand
functions, arbitrage always increases welfare, as long as both markets are served (see
section 2). Before formally introducing our model, we show with a simple numerical
example that this is no longer the case when there are production-cost diﬀerences
between the regions and when transmission capacity is limited.
We consider two regions i 2 f1,2g. In each region there are price-taking consumers,
represented by a linear demand function q
i(p):
q1(p) = 8 ¡ p
q2(p) = 6 ¡ p
In the standard third-degree price-discrimination model, the incumbent monopolist
can sell freely in both markets and has production costs normalized to zero.
If there is no arbitrage, the monopolist will set the local monopoly prices in each
region pNA
1 = 4 and pNA
2 = 3, i.e. the prices that maximize local proﬁt q(pi)¢(pi¡0).
If there is arbitrage, then the monopolist sets a uniform price p for both regions. He
maximizes the joint proﬁt (q1(p)+q2(p))¢(p¡0), and sets the price p = pA
1 = pA
2 =
3.5. As arbitrage increases the allocative eﬃciency in the market, and total output
remains constant q1 + q2 = 7, it is obvious that arbitrage increases total welfare,
which can also be seen numerically. Welfare increases from 37.5 to 37.75.
9Let us assume now that there are production-cost diﬀerences. The cost of production
in region 1 is ∆c = 3 and that in region 2 remains normalized to zero. Further, we
assume that the transmission capacity between the two regions is limited to a total
capacity of k = 2, but that there are no capacity limits on the production itself.
Without arbitrage, the monopolist will use the transmission line to import energy
from the low-cost area to the high-cost area, up to the transmission capacity. By
transporting goods from the low-cost area to the high-cost area, he reduces produc-
tion costs with k ¢∆c. The monopolist will use the transmission line up to capacity.
The monopolist will set the local monopoly prices in each region, taking into account
local production costs. He will maximize proﬁt in the low-cost area q2(p2) ¢ (p2 ¡ 0)
by setting a price pNA
2 = 3 as before. In the high-cost region, the monopolist max-
imizes q1(p1) ¢ (p1 ¡ 4c), by setting a price pNA
1 = 5.5. Total output is equal to
q1 + q2 = 5.5.
With arbitrage, arbitrageurs will export energy from the low-priced region to the
high-priced region. The monopolist will therefore sell less in the high-priced region,
and more in the low-priced region. While setting prices, the monopolist takes this
into account. In the high-priced area the monopolist sets the price pA
1 = 4.5, which
maximizes his local proﬁt (q(p1)¡k)(p1¡∆c). In the low-priced area, the monopolist
sets the price pA
2 = 4, which maximizes local proﬁt (q(p2) + k)(p2 ¡ 0).
Arbitrage decreases the price diﬀerence between the regions, but does not eliminate
the diﬀerence completely. As before, there is no output eﬀect, and total output is
equal to 5.5 units with or without arbitrage.
As total output has remained constant, can we still conclude that arbitrage in-
creases welfare? A quick calculation shows that this is not the case. Welfare
W = U1(q1)+U2(q2)¡∆c¢(q1 ¡k) decreases with arbitrage from 28.875 to 27.375,
where Ui(qi) represents the gross consumer surplus. The reason is that arbitrage did
not only change the allocation of the goods, but also the production location. Total
10production costs ∆c ¢ (q1 ¡ k) increased from 0.5 to 1.5.
In summary, the output eﬀect of arbitrage is zero, and while arbitrage increased
allocational eﬃciency (the regional price diﬀerence decreased), it reduced production
eﬃciency. This latter eﬀect outweighed the former eﬀect, given that total welfare
decreased under arbitrage.
4 Model description
This section presents a formal model on the eﬀect of arbitrage in the electricity
sector. It extends the standard third-degree price discrimination model, assuming
that interregional transmission capacity is small, and that each region has diﬀerent
production costs.6
We compare two access regimes for the allocation of transmission capacity. In the
ﬁrst regime, the no-arbitrage regime (NA), we assume that the incumbent remains
the only user of the transmission line. Arbitrageurs ﬁnd it diﬃcult or impossible
to buy transmission capacity to proﬁt from arbitrage on regional price diﬀerences.
This might happen, for instance, when the incumbent owns the transmission capacity
and access to the transmission line is inadequately regulated, or when the incumbent
sells power with a resale restriction, forbidding consumers to resell their electricity
and thereby drying up the liquidity on the energy markets. In the second regime,
the arbitrage regime (A), the monopolist has to share the transmission line with
arbitrageurs. Arbitrageurs buy transmission capacity and trade electricity from the
low-price- to the high-price region until the price for transmission equals the price
diﬀerence between the two regions. This occurs when access to the transmission
6Transmission capacity is “small” when, independent of the access regime, the transmission
line is congested. In the appendix we deﬁne“small”transmission capacity as a function of demand
functions and production costs. Note, however, that we neglect production constraints, and assume
constant marginal production costs.
11line is auctioned eﬃciently and each region has a well-functioning energy market.
Some regional power exchanges go even further by collaborating and setting up
trading systems that by design eliminate arbitrage opportunities, given the technical
constraints of the system. This is called market coupling in Europe.7 The model
assumes that the monopolist is a “ﬁrst mover” that has three decision variables
in each regime: price setting in region 1 and in region 2, and determining the
amount of transmission it will use. The monopolist perfectly foresees how consumers
and arbitrageurs (if they are present) will react to his decisions. Consumers and
arbitrageurs are modeled as “price takers” (i.e. they react to prices). Consumers
decide, given the market price, how much energy they will consume. If arbitrageurs
are present, they trade transmission capacity, until the price for transmission is equal
to the price diﬀerence between the regions.
We assume that both the energy market and the transmission market clear simulta-
neously, and therefore do not model the micro-structure of the electrical energy- and
the transmission markets. In particular, we will not describe the auction mechanism
that is used to allocate transmission capacity. See Joskow and Tirole (2000) for a
discussion of diﬀerent mechanisms.
We choose to present the model assuming that the monopolist sets the regional
price for electricity. Alternatively, we could build a model where the monopolist
has three diﬀerent decision variables: setting the amount of electricity it sells in
each region and determining how much it will transport; however, the results would
not change.8 The advantage of our approach (prices are strategic variables) is that
7Note that Arbitrage (A) and No-arbitrage (NA) are two extreme cases. Arbitrage could be
hampered even when transmission capacity is auctioned. This might happen if “gate closure”, the
moment when ﬁnal bids have to be submitted in the auction, are diﬀerent for the transmission
market and the two power markets. If arbitrageurs need to buy transmission capacity before the
electricity price is known, their risk increases, and arbitrage becomes less easy.
8This result holds in almost all models where there is one strategic player and all other players
are price takers. In a standard monopoly model, for instance, it does not matter whether price or
quantity is the strategic variable.
12it is very similar to the standard third-degree price discrimination literature, and
we can focus on the extra eﬀects of transmission constraints and production-cost
diﬀerences. However, the behavior of the arbitrageurs might be easier to explain in
the quantity model, and also second-order conditions are more easily checked in a
quantity framework (see Appendix).
4.1 Formal model
Consider two regions i 2 f1,2g. In each region there are price-taking consumers,
represented by a downward-sloping and concave demand function qi(p). The incum-
bent player is active in both markets and has marginal production cost cH in region
1 and cL in region 2 (cH ¡cL = ∆c > 0). Transportation from region 2 to region 1 is
costless9, but limited by the thermal transmission constraint k of the transmission
line that connects both regions. If the demand for transportation is larger than
the capacity of the line, it becomes a scarce good with a positive price. The price
of the transmission rights will be denoted by τ. Access to the transmission line is
sold at a price τ and the monopolist and arbitrageurs buy xM and xA transmission
rights with xM + xA · k. The monopolist maximizes proﬁt by setting the price pi
in region i, and by transporting xM from region 2 to region 1. When it takes its
decisions it will foresee the reactions of arbitrageurs and consumers. Their reaction
will determine the price for transmission τ and the amount of transmission rights
arbitrageurs buy, xA. The resulting price is diﬀerent for the two access regimes:
In the access regime without arbitrage (NA), the monopolist is the sole user of
transmission capacity (xNA
A = 0). As there are no arbitrageurs, there is no upward
pressure on the transmission price, which is therefore zero (τNA = 0). As a conse-
quence, the monopolist uses the entire transmission capacity to import cheap units
from the low-cost region (xM = k).
9We neglect the losses on the network.
13In the access regime with arbitrage (A), arbitrageurs will trade energy until the
price for transmission capacity is equal to the price diﬀerence (τA = ∆p ´ p1 ¡ p2),
and will buy all transmission capacity that is left on the market by the monopolist
(xA
A = k ¡ xM).10
The proﬁt of the monopolist is equal to the revenue from selling si minus the pro-
duction cost of producing ri in region i, minus the transmission cost:
π = s1p1 + s2p2 | {z } ¡ r1cH + r2cL | {z } ¡ τ
txM |{z}
Revenue Production cost Transmission cost
(1)
In region i, the monopolist sells si at a price pi. Sales in region 1 are provided by
producing r1 locally and by importing xM units from region 2 (s1 = r1 +xM). Sales
in region 2 are equal to the production in region 2 minus the export to region 1
(s2 = r2 ¡ xM). In addition, the monopolist needs to pay τtxM for obtaining the
transmission rights.
The sales s1 in region 1 are equal to the demand in region 1 minus the amount that
arbitrageurs import into region 1.
s1 = q1(p1) ¡ xA (2)
The sales s2 in region 2 are equal to the demand in region 2 plus the amount that
arbitrageurs export from region 2.
s2 = q2(p2) + xA (3)
Equations 2 and 3 describe the sales of the incumbent. In the absence of arbitrage
10To be more precise, this result is valid only when ∆p ¸ 0. If the monopolist sets a negative price
diﬀerence (∆p · 0), arbitrageurs would trade in the opposite direction and xA
A = ¡k ¡ xM · 0.
See appendix.
14(xA = 0), the market “sealed”. The monopolist could set any price in the two
markets, without having leakage from one market to the other. With arbitrage,
however, some “leakage” will occur, since arbitrageurs will buy electricity in the
high-price region and sell it in the low-price region. This formulation is similar to
Varian (1985).
Rewriting the monopolist’s proﬁt in equation 1, by assuming binding transmission
capacity (xM + xA = k), and taking relations 2 and 3 into account, we obtain
π = q1(p1)(p1 ¡ cH) + q2(p2)(p2 ¡ cL) + (xM + xA)∆c
| {z }
production





This formulation is similar to the classical third-degree discrimination model. How-
ever, it includes three extra terms. Producing goods in the low-cost region reduces
total costs for the monopolist. Given the “leakage”, the monopolist loses proﬁtable
sales in the high-priced region, and these losses cannot be made up by selling more in
the low-priced region. The last term is the monopolist’s cost of buying transmission
rights.
5 The incumbent at work
This section derives the strategy of the incumbent under the two access regimes and
describes how the monopolist adjusts his strategy in response to arbitrage. We show
the following: The monopolist understands that with arbitrage, price discrimination
is less proﬁtable (equation 4), as leakage will occur (xA ¸ 0) and transportation will
become costly (τ = ∆p). Therefore, the incumbent decides to reduce the interre-
gional price diﬀerence, reducing both the leakage and transportation costs. We now
discuss both pricing strategies in turn.
155.1 Exclusive use by the incumbent
In the ﬁrst case, the incumbent has exclusive access to the line. The monopolist
maximizes his proﬁt (4) by choosing the prices pi in region i and transporting the
amount xM. As transmission capacity is small, the monopolist will use all avail-
able capacity of the line to substitute expensive generation in region 1 with cheap
generation in region 2 (xM = k). The proﬁt equation simpliﬁes to
π
NA = q1(p1)(p1 ¡ cH) + q2(p2)(p2 ¡ cL) + k∆c. (5)
The prices set by the monopolist pNA
1 and pNA


















with εi = ¡pi
q0
i(pi)
qi(pi) denoting the demand elasticity in region i. Hence, without arbi-












In the appendix, we describe the optimization problem 5 of the monopolist in more
detail, and we show that equations 6 and 7 are indeed necessary and suﬃcient con-
ditions for the prices set by the monopolist, under the assumption that transmission
capacity is suﬃciently small. This is not obvious, as the optimization problem of
the monopolist is not convex in prices, and therefore ﬁrst-order conditions are not
16suﬃcient to ﬁnd a global optimum.
5.2 Market allocation of transmission
In the second case, arbitrageurs can obtain access to the line and buy transmission
capacity. This case is denoted A (arbitrage). Again, the monopolist maximizes proﬁt
(4) by setting the price pi and choosing xM. In the case where there is arbitrage,
the price for transmission τ is equal to the regional price diﬀerence ∆p.
In the appendix, we show that the monopolist ﬁnds it in its own interest to set
a positive price diﬀerence ∆p > 0, as long as transmission capacity is suﬃciently
small. In order for this to be the case, we will show it is suﬃcient to assume that
the monopoly price in the high-cost region is higher than the monopoly price in the
low-cost region pM
1 (cH) > pM
2 (cL). This assumption ensures that arbitrageurs and
the incumbent have an incentive to trade in the same direction. The monopolist
wants to transport energy from the low-cost region to the high-cost region, and the
arbitrageurs from the low-price to the high-price region. The assumption that the
monopoly price in the high-cost region is high, is valid when the demand function is
concave and similar in both regions. If the price in the high-cost region is below the
price in the low-cost region, then arbitrageurs will have the incentive to export energy
from the high-cost region and import it to the low-cost region. It is obvious that
this will increase production costs and that arbitrage is likely to decrease welfare.
The interested reader can check Willems (2002) for a more detailed discussion of
this situation.
Arbitrageurs will buy all remaining transmission capacity xA = k ¡xM to arbitrage
away price diﬀerences. Hence, the transmission capacity is binding (xM + xA = k).
The proﬁt of the monopolist can be rewritten as follows:
q1(p1)(p1 ¡ cH) + q2(p2)(p2 ¡ cL) + k(∆c ¡ τ). (10)
17Clearly, this objective function depends on p1 and p2. Changing the price pi impacts
not only the regional proﬁts qi(pi)(pi ¡cj) but also the total transmission cost kτ.11
The monopolist will set the prices pA
1 and pA


























The relative price-cost margin is equal to the inverse of the elasticity multiplied by
a correction factor: the ratio of local production ri and local consumption qi. In
the appendix, we show that these ﬁrst-order conditions are necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for the global optimum of the monopolist, as long as transmission capacity
is suﬃciently small.
5.3 Comparison
This section compares the prices set by the monopolist under both access regimes,
and shows that arbitrage will induce the monopolist to reduce the regional price
diﬀerence, for a small transmission capacity k ! 0. The argument goes as follows:
in the extreme case of zero transmission capacity (k = 0), local production is equal
to local consumption (ri = qi in equations 11 and 12). According to equations 6, 7,
11 and 12, the proﬁt-maximizing prices are identical in both access regimes, and are
11Note that it does not matter who uses the transmission line. If the monopolist buys transmis-
sion capacity, he has to pay xMτ. If arbitrageurs buy transmission capacity, the monopolist will
sell xA units more in the low-price region, but lose xA units in the high-price region. In total, this
loss due to arbitrage is equal to xA∆p = xAτ. Hence, the total cost of transmission amounts to
(xM + xA)τ = kτ, regardless of whoever uses the line.















A marginal increase of transmission capacity away from zero does not aﬀect prices





















with Ei = ¡
qipi(qi)00
pi(qi)0 the relative curvature coeﬃcient (or adjusted concavity) of the
demand function in region i. Hence, for concave functions, the price in the low-
price region 2 increases and the price in the high-price region 1 decreases when
transmission capacity increases. If the transmission capacity is small, then price
arbitrage reduces the price diﬀerence between the regions, compared to the case
without arbitrage.
6 This paper’s contributions
Highlighted in this section are three contributions made by this paper to the third-
degree price discrimination literature. First of all, we prove that for the electricity
market, the eﬀect of arbitrage is no longer the combination of only an allocational
and an output eﬀect, but that also a third eﬀect needs to be taken into account:
the production eﬀect. Then, contrary to the standard results, we show that for
linear demand functions, arbitrage is often welfare decreasing, because production
eﬃciency is reduced. It is the case when demand functions are similar and cost
19diﬀerences relatively large. Finally, we deﬁne necessary and suﬃcient conditions for
welfare to increase under arbitrage for the category of concave demand functions.
6.1 The production eﬀect
The main intuition from the literature (See section 2) on third-degree price discrim-
ination is that the welfare eﬀect of arbitrage can be determined as the sum of an
allocational eﬀect (which is positive) and an output eﬀect (which can be positive or
negative). Arbitrage improves allocational eﬃciency, as it allocates a given output
more eﬃciently among consumers.12 Arbitrage might have a positive or a nega-
tive output eﬀect, as the monopolist might decrease or increase its output level in
response to arbitrage (Tirole, 1988).
If we introduce transmission-capacity constraints and production-cost diﬀerences,
this result is no longer valid, as a third eﬀect - the production eﬀect - needs to be
considered. Arbitrage not only aﬀects the allocation of goods among consumers, but
also the location of production. Welfare decreases when electricity is produced less
eﬃciently by shifting production from the low-cost to the high-cost region. Hence,
arbitrage has three eﬀects: an output eﬀect, an allocational eﬀect and a production
eﬀect. However, as long as the transmission line remains congested, the allocational
and the production eﬀects are linked with each other. The production and consump-
tion locations cannot be chosen independently. Therefore, we deﬁne the interregional
eﬀect as the combination of these two eﬀects. Typically, there is a trade-oﬀ: arbi-
trage increases allocational eﬃciency but reduces production eﬃciency. Interregional
eﬃciency is achieved when the two eﬀects are balanced: the gain of consumer surplus
is equal to the loss of production eﬃciency. The welfare eﬀect of arbitrage is the sum
of an output eﬀect and the interregional eﬀect, where the latter is the combination
12Without arbitrage, consumers in one region have a higher willingness to pay than do their
counterparts in the other region, and a reallocation of goods would lead to a Pareto improvement.
20of the allocational and production eﬀects.
Deﬁne social welfare W as the sum of consumer surplus minus production costs,
which can be written as a function of quantities q1,q2 and transport x = xA + xM:
W(q1,q2,x) = U1(q1) ¡ q1cH + U2(q2) ¡ q2cL + x∆c
We say that arbitrage increases interregional eﬃciency if (keeping total production
q = q1 + q2 constant) welfare increases with a decrease of the price diﬀerence ∆p.








Note that this partial derivative is taken under the assumption that the transmission
line remains congested x = k.
Proposition 1 If transmission capacity is fully used and if the price diﬀerence is
smaller than the production-cost diﬀerence ∆p · ∆c, then arbitrage decreases inter-
regional eﬃciency.
Proof. We are interested in the marginal welfare eﬀect dW
dW = (p1 ¡ cH)dq1 + (p2 ¡ cL)dq2 + ∆c ¢ dx (18)








when the transmission line is congested dx = 0, and total production remains con-
stant
dq = dq1 + dq2 = 0. (20)






= ρ ¢ [∆c ¡ ∆p], (21)




2 ) > 0.
The equation shows that the welfare eﬀect of a marginal change of the price diﬀerence
is proportional to (∆c ¡ ∆p). If ρ units of demand are shifted from region 1 to
region 2, then also ρ units of production need to be shifted from region 1 to region
2, as the transmission capacity is assumed to be binding. At the margin, shifting
demand decreases consumer surplus by ρ∆p, and decreases production costs by ρ∆c.
Combining equation 21 with the result of section 5.3 (arbitrage reduces the regional
price diﬀerence ∆p ) proves the proposition.
Proposition 1 shows that if there are regional cost diﬀerences and limited trans-
mission capacity, then interregional eﬃciency depends not only on the location of
consumption but also on the location of production. Although arbitrage reduces the
price diﬀerence, which improves the allocation of consumption, it may also worsen
the allocation of production. Depending on regional price- and cost diﬀerences, the
eﬀect of arbitrage on interregional eﬃciency might be positive or negative. In the
optimum, demand and production should be allocated such that the price diﬀerence
equals the cost diﬀerence.
We can apply the intuition of this result to the Belgian-Dutch electricity market.
Electrabel has a dominant position in Belgium (90%) and in the Netherlands (20%).
With respect to the model, Belgium is the low-priced country that exports energy
to the Netherlands (pBE < pNL). The transmission line is congested about 30% of
the time.13 In November 2006 the two electricity markets were coupled, in order to
improve cross-border arbitrage between the two countries. The two countries might
13Data provided by the Dutch transmission system operator, TenneT.
22have substantial production-cost diﬀerences, as electricity generation is essentially
nuclear (55%) and gas ﬁred (28%) in Belgium, whereas it is mainly gas (64%) and
coal ﬁred (23%) in the Netherlands.14 Assuming that Electrabel’s competitors in
the Netherlands behave as a competitive fringe15, the welfare eﬀects of improved
arbitrage can be predicted by our model. Welfare will decrease when the price
diﬀerence is smaller than the production-cost diﬀerence (and the output eﬀect is
negligible). It is not straightforward to determine the marginal cost in the two
countries, as this depends not only on the generation mix but also on other factors
such as the time of day, environmental regulation, the maintenance schedule, and
the price of fuel and CO2 permits. We therefore do not derive the welfare eﬀect
directly (by comparing price and cost diﬀerences for every possible conﬁguration)
but indirectly (by looking at the incentives of Electrabel). Electrabel has fewer
incentives to increase prices above the marginal cost in the Netherlands than it does
in Belgium, as Electrabel’s residual demand in the Netherlands is ﬂatter than in
Belgium (given competition with the fringe), and as its sales in the Netherlands are
smaller than in Belgium. Price-cost mark-ups are therefore higher in Belgium than
in the Netherlands:
pBE ¡ cBE > pNL ¡ cNL .16 Hence, when the transmission line is congested, then
the cost diﬀerence between the Netherlands and Belgium is larger than the price
diﬀerence, cNL ¡ cBE > pNL ¡ pBE > 0, and arbitrage will reduce welfare (if the
output eﬀect is small).17 In periods in which there is no congestion (70% of the time),
14Eurostat.
15Nuon, Essent and RWE each have 20% of the capacity in the Netherlands, and smaller gener-
ators own the remaining 20%.
16The price-cost markup in region i depends on the slope of the residual demand function and
the total sales in a region: pi ¡ ci = ¡qipR0(qi) where pR0(qi) is the slope of the inverse residual
demand function. Electrabel sells less in the Netherlands (qNL < qBE), and faces a ﬂatter residual
demand functionjpR
NL0(qNL)j < jpR
BE0(qBE)j, hence mark-ups are smaller.
17It is not straightforward to determine the marginal cost in the two countries, as this depends
not only on the generation mix but also on other factors such as the time of day, environmental
regulation, the maintenance schedule, and the price of fuel and CO2 permits.
23arbitrage will increase welfare by reducing the possibility to price discriminate. The
overall eﬀect of arbitrage could go either way.
6.2 Welfare eﬀects for linear demand
This section examines the welfare eﬀects of arbitrage when the demand functions
are linear and take the form qi(p) = αi ¡ βip with αi > 0 and βi > 0. We use the
linear model to illustrate the proposition we derived in the previous section. The
advantage of using linear functions is that the output eﬀect is zero (Robinson, 1933),
which allows us to concentrate on the interregional eﬀects of arbitrage. Recall from
section 6.1 that interregional eﬃciency requires the price diﬀerence to be equal to
the cost diﬀerence between the two regions ∆popt = ∆c.
Straightforward calculation shows that the price diﬀerence under arbitrage (A) and






























β2 is a measure of the regional diﬀerence of consumer preferences.
When the two demand functions are similar (0 · χ < ∆c), then the price diﬀerence
without arbitrage is below the optimum (∆pNA · ∆c). The intuition for this is that
the monopolist will not fully pass along an increase in production costs to consumers.
As arbitrage makes price discrimination costly for the monopolist, the monopolist
will react by decreasing the price diﬀerence (∆pNA ¸ ∆pA). Therefore, as the price





24and hence (as there is not output eﬀect) lowers welfare.18 This is summarized in the
following proposition:
Proposition 2 For similar linear demand functions (0 · χ < ∆c), and with bind-
ing transmission constraints, arbitrage is welfare decreasing.
Proof. The proof follows from the discussion above.
In contrast to the standard literature (Robinson, 1933), we have shown that ar-
bitrage decreases welfare for linear demand functions when consumers have similar
preferences, production-cost diﬀerences matter and transmission capacity is binding.
The following corollary shows that allowing for arbitrage makes sense only when the
market power of the incumbent is broken in at least one of the two regions:
Corollary 3 If there is perfect competition in the low-cost region 2 and linear de-
mand in both regions, then arbitrage is always beneﬁcial.
Proof. If there is perfect competition in the low-cost region 2, then the residual
demand function for the monopolist is perfectly elastic β2 ! 1 , and the price in
the low-cost region is
α2
β2 = cL. The price in the high-cost region 1 is always above
cH. Arbitrage gives an incentive to decrease the price diﬀerence between the regions,
and hence decreases the price in region 1, which is always optimal.
Practically, this means that market coupling between, for instance, the Netherlands
(with a relatively concentrated and high-cost market) and Norway (with a compet-
itive and low-cost market) is not likely to raise competition policy issues.
18It might be instructive to look back at the results of section 3. In the example, demand
functions are relatively similar, as χ = 8 ¡ 6 = 2 · ∆c = 3. Arbitrage does not change total
production, but reduces the price diﬀerence from ∆pNA = 2.5 to ∆pA = 0.5. However, the optimal
price diﬀerence is ∆c = 3; hence, total welfare decreased.
256.3 Welfare and output eﬀect for non-linear demand
When demand is non-linear, the monopolist will not only change the price diﬀerence
in response to arbitrage, but will also adjust total production. This section derives
the output- and welfare eﬀects of arbitrage for concave demand functions and for
small transmission capacities.
We show that the output eﬀect depends crucially on the curvature of the demand
functions and obtain similar results as in the standard model on third-degree price
discrimination (Robinson, 1933).
We further explain that in order to study the welfare eﬀect of arbitrage, one needs to
compare the regional demand functions with respect to three factors: the curvature
of demand (which determines the output eﬀect), the regional price level (which
determines the allocational eﬀect), and the elasticity of demand (which determines
the price-cost margin, and therefore (indirectly) the production eﬀect).
In order to derive our results, we assume that transmission capacity is “inﬁnitesi-
mally” small and evaluate total output (and total welfare) under the two regimes
using a Taylor expansion around k = 0. We use the fact that the two regimes give
identical results when k = 0. Our results are in that sense similar to Robinson
(1933), who assumes that price diﬀerences are (inﬁnitesimally) small. We do not
derive results for larger transmission capacities, as this would require integration of
the output (and welfare) functions over a range of diﬀerent levels of k, and, in order
to make general statements when comparing these integrated functions, one would
need to make assumptions on even higher order derivatives of the demand functions.
This would not provide any additional intuition.
The section starts with the output eﬀect, followed by the welfare eﬀect.










i(k)) is the demand in region i when the monopolist sets prices
pl
i(k) under regime l.
The following proposition gives necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the output
eﬀect to be positive QA(k) ¸ QNA(k), and derives a similar result as Robinson
(1933) .
Proposition 4 Arbitrage increases total output for transmission capacities close to
zero (k ! 0) if and only if demand in the low-cost region is more concave, i.e. when
E1(p
m
1 (cH)) ¸ E2(p
m
2 (cL)), (25)








i(pi))2 < 0 denotes the adjusted concavity.
Proof. Using the Taylor approximation for small k ! 0, arbitrage increases total
production if and only if
Q








This expression can be simpliﬁed. When transmission capacity k = 0, then the
total level of consumption does not depend on the access regime QA(0) = QNA(0).
Without arbitrage, increasing the size of the transmission capacity does not change
total production (hence,
dQNA
dk (0) = 0). Therefore, arbitrage increases total output if





Using equations 15 and 16, we can derive the eﬀect of transmission capacity on total




















Rearranging this expression gives the proof of the proposition.
In sections 6.1 and 6.2 we showed that arbitrage might decrease interregional eﬃ-
ciency in the market and that an increase of total output is therefore no longer a
suﬃcient condition for welfare to increase under arbitrage. Arbitrage will increase
welfare only when a large increase in output oﬀsets the reduction of interregional
eﬃciency.






2(k),k) l = A,NA. (26)
The following proposition derives necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the welfare
eﬀect to be positive V A(k) ¸ V NA(k) for small transmission capacities. As in
Varian (1985), we derive conditions for the welfare eﬀect, without relying on the
output eﬀect.
Proposition 5 Deﬁne the function fi(p) =
εi(p)




as the demand elasticity in region i. Arbitrage increases welfare for transmission
capacities close to zero (k ! 0) if and only if
f2(p
m
2 (cL)) > f1(p
m
1 (cH)). (27)
28Proof. Arbitrage increases welfare for small transmission capacities when
V








Here, we make a ﬁrst-order approximation of the welfare function V around k = 0,
taking into account the behavior of the monopolist. Welfare is equal under both
regimes for k = 0 (V A(0) = V NA(0)), so that both terms drop out of the inequality.



















It is the sum of three parts: The ﬁnal term in the expression is the cost advantage of
extra transmission capacity: production in the high-cost region is substituted by low-
cost production. The ﬁrst two terms describe the eﬀect of transmission capacity on
welfare in each of the regions, taking into account the adjustments of the incumbent
in response to an increase of transmission capacity.
Without arbitrage, the marginal eﬀect of transmission capacity is
dV NA(0)
dk
= ∆c > 0. (29)
With larger transmission capacity, electricity will be produced more cheaply, thereby
increasing production eﬃciency, although prices and, hence, consumption remain
constant (the ﬁrst two terms are zero).
With arbitrage, consumption in the two regions depends on the size of the transmis-
sion line, as the monopolist will reduce the price diﬀerence between the two regions.














29Increasing transmission capacity changes regional welfare levels (the ﬁrst two terms
are diﬀerent from zero) and allows for more export from the low-cost region. Note
that the cost advantage from importing more from the low-cost region is identical in
the cases with and without arbitrage. Hence, using equations 29 and 30, arbitrage















Here we also use the relation between the relative price-cost margin and the de-
mand elasticity as given by the ﬁrst-order conditions 11 and 12. This proves the
proposition.
If the low-cost region is more elastic, more concave and has a lower monopoly price,
then arbitrage increases welfare. This generalizes corollary 3: if the low-cost region
is perfectly competitive (ε = +1 andE = 0), then arbitrage will always increase
welfare.
For equal regional demand functions, the following corollary immediately follows:
Corollary 6 If two regions have identical concave demand functions qi(¢) = e q(¢)
and f0 < 0 (> 0) for all p, then arbitrage increases (decreases) welfare.
Proof. If both regions have an identical concave demand function: q1(¢) = q2(¢) =
q(¢), then the monopolist passes cost diﬀerences only partially along to his con-
sumers 0 <
∂pM
∂c < 1. The monopolist sets the highest price in the high-cost region:
pM(cL) < pM(cH). Using the fact that f0(p) > 0, the results follow directly from
proposition 5.
In order to illustrate the results of this corollary, assume identical quadratic demand
functions q(p) = α¡βp¡γp2 for both regions (α,β,γ 2 <+). Arbitrage will reduce






α ), which ensures that f0(p) > 0 for all p ¸ 0.19 This result for quadratic
functions naturally extends the linear demand case where γ = 0. For large values
of γ, arbitrage might increase or decrease welfare, and no general conditions can be
formulated.
7 Conclusion
This paper analyzes third-degree price discrimination in electricity markets. It de-
velops a model in which a monopolist sells a ﬁnal good in two regional markets,
transmission capacity between regions is limited and production costs are high in
one of the regions. We investigate whether access to the transmission capacity should
be auctioned in order to facilitate regional arbitrage or whether the dominant in-
cumbent ﬁrm should have the exclusive usage rights.
We show that the results of the classical third-degree price-discrimination model do
not hold for electricity markets. The classical model identiﬁes two eﬀects of arbitrage
on social welfare: the allocational eﬀect and the output eﬀect. Allocational eﬃciency
requires that marginal willingness to pay be equalized across regions. Therefore, for a
given total output, arbitrage ensures an eﬃcient allocation of this output as regional
price diﬀerences disappear. On the other hand, total output may increase or decrease
as a result of arbitrage, where an increase is associated with higher social welfare.
For electricity markets we identify a third welfare eﬀect of arbitrage: production
eﬃciency. Arbitrage will typically reduce production eﬃciency, as less electricity is
produced in the low-cost region.
With regard to linear demand, the classical model shows that arbitrage increases
19For the quadratic demand function, f0(p) > 0 if and only if E(p) > ¡1 ¡
p
3. Arbitrage will
certainly reduce welfare if this condition holds for all p ¸ 0.
31welfare, as total output remains constant, but that the reduction of regional price
diﬀerences increases allocational eﬃciency. In electricity markets, arbitrage will
reduce welfare if cost diﬀerences are important.
Regarding concave demand functions, the paper then derives necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for welfare to increase with arbitrage. It is shown that arbitrage increases
welfare when the low-cost region has a more elastic and less concave demand function
and a lower autarky price.
The policy recommendation of this paper is that the introduction of market mecha-
nisms for the allocation of essential facilities only makes sense when suﬃcient invest-
ment is made in transmission capacities or when the market power of the incumbent
is broken in at least one of the two markets.
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34A Appendix
This appendix describes the optimization problem of the monopolist and speciﬁes
the assumptions of the paper. Its main objective is to show that for suﬃciently small
transmission capacities, the equilibrium prices are given by equations 6, 7, 11 and
12. The model in the appendix is richer than that described in the main text, as
we recognize that the monopolist might sometimes have the incentive to transport
energy from the high-cost to the low-cost region (for reasons of price discrimination)
and we take into account minimal production and consumption constraints. We
show that the monopolist solves a non-convex optimization problem, and that ﬁrst-
order conditions are not always suﬃcient for a global optimum. The appendix
contains four subsections. Subsection A.1 gives the assumptions and deﬁnitions of
the model. We then solve the optimization problem of the monopolist without and
with arbitrage. The last subsection combines the results of the ﬁrst three subsections.
A.1 Assumptions and deﬁnitions
We describe demand in region i = 1,2 by a concave demand function qi(p). Local
unit production costs in regions 1 and 2 are respectively cH and cL with ∆c =
cH ¡ cL ¸ 0. For large levels of demand, the price in both regions is lower than
the marginal cost: limQ!1 Pi(Q) · cL where Pi(Q) is the inverse demand function.
This condition guarantees that the optimum is found at ﬁnite production capacities.
In order to simplify notation, we denote by pM
ij the price that a ﬁctive monopolist





(qi(p)(qi ¡ cj)). (32)
35Using this deﬁnition, the autarky price in regions 1 and 2 (i.e. the monopoly price
when there is no interregional trade) is pM
1H and pM
2L. One of the main assumptions







This assumption will reduce considerably the number of local equilibria we need to
consider in the model. Further, we assume that in the standard arbitrage model
without transmission constraints (but with identical demand speciﬁcation), the mo-
nopolist will not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to “shut down” one of the markets and to sell
all goods in the other market at that market’s local monopoly price. A suﬃcient
condition for this is that the reservation price in region 2 ¯ p2 = P2(0) is larger than
the monopoly price in region 1 (¯ p2 ¸ pM
1H). In this case, the monopolist will set a







where εtot is the elasticity of total demand of the two regions taken together.
A.2 Optimization program without arbitrage
Without arbitrage (NA), the incumbent has the exclusive use of the transmission
capacity and solves the following optimization problem:
max
p1,p2,xπ
NA = (p1 ¡ cH)q1(p1) + (p2 ¡ cL)q2(p2) + x∆c
s.t. q1(p1) ¸ max(0,x)
q2(p2) ¸ max(0,¡x)
k ¸ x ¸ ¡k
36The variable x represents the amount of electricity transported from region 2 to
region 1. Negative numbers mean transport levels in the opposite direction. As
production cannot become negative, consumption in a region should be larger than
imports into that region. Furthermore, the amount of electricity transported from
one region to the other cannot exceed the transmission capacity of the line k. Note
that we allow prices to be negative.
The objective of the monopolist is not concave for low price levels, because the price
in the high-cost region 1 might be below the marginal cost cH when transmission
capacity is suﬃciently large. It is therefore by no means guaranteed that a solution
of the ﬁrst order conditions 6 and 7 gives a unique set of prices and transportation
levels that maximize the proﬁt of the monopolist. There might be several local
maxima (and local minima) satisfying these conditions.
Second-order conditions In order to prove that the ﬁrst-order conditions are
necessary and suﬃcient for the global optimum, we rewrite the problem using quan-
tities. The decision variables (p1,p2,x) of the optimization problem can be uniquely





NA = P1(Q1)Q1 + P2(Q2)Q2 ¡ cHr1 ¡ cLr2
s.t. Qi ¸ 0 ri ¸ 0
Q1 + Q2 = r1 + r2
k ¸ Q1 ¡ r1 ¸ ¡k
This optimization problem has an (unbounded) convex set of constraints, and a
concave objective function. The ﬁrst-order conditions of this problem are therefore
suﬃcient conditions for an equilibrium. If a vector (Q1,Q2,r1,r2) satisﬁes the ﬁrst-
37order conditions, then it is a global maximum of the problem. There is, however, no
guarantee yet that such a point exists, because the constraint set is unbounded - as
local production and consumption can be increased simultaneously without violating
any constraint. However, the monopolist will never sell an amount that will drive
prices down below cL. A global optimum thus exists, given the assumption that
limQ!1 Pi(Q) < cL.
Optimal Prices The ﬁrst-order conditions of the optimization problem determine
the prices pNA
i that the monopolist sets in region i. In the low-cost region 2, the
price is always equal to the local monopoly price pNA
2 = pM
2L. In region 1, the price
pNA
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1j is deﬁned by equation (32) and pk
1 = P1(k).
A.3 Optimization program with arbitrage
This subsection describes the market when there is interregional arbitrage (A). In
the main text we assumed that the transmission line was congested, and that elec-
tricity is always transported from the low- to the high-cost region. Here we drop
these assumptions and allow the line not to be congested, and even allow that the
monopolist transports energy from the high-cost region to the low-cost region. Such




A = (p1 ¡ cH)q1(p1) + (p2 ¡ cL)q2(p2) + x(∆c ¡ ∆p)
s.t. q1(p1) ¸ max(0,x)
q2(p2) ¸ max(0,¡x)
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∆p ¸ 0 if x = k
∆p = 0 if ¡k < x < k
∆p · 0 if x = ¡k.
The monopolist sets the price in each region, and determines (indirectly) the level
of transport from region 2 to region 1. Under arbitrage, the use of the transmission
line is determined by the action of the arbitrageurs. The last three lines describe
their actions, which depend on the regional price diﬀerence ∆p = p1¡p2. As for the
case without arbitrage, the production and consumption levels should be positive in
each region.
Since the problem of the monopolist is a non-convex optimization problem, solutions
are not straightforward. The objective function is not concave (1) given the product
term x∆p in the objective function, (2) for low prices in region p1 (below cH), the
objective function is not concave in prices and (3) the behavior of the arbitrageurs
is described by a highly non-convex set of equations.
A.3.1 Splitting the optimization problem of the monopolist
The optimization problem of the monopolist is called a Mathematical Program with
Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC, Luo et al., 1996). This type of model is diﬃcult
to solve, as the conditions for the transmission market equilibrium are highly non-
convex. We will solve the problem by splitting the non-convex feasible set into three
price regions. Once the optimization problem has been solved for each of the regions,




s.t. (p1,p2,x) 2 S(p1,p2) (35)
with S(p1,p2) denoting the feasible set of prices and transmission levels:
S =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
S> if p1 > p2 price region I
S= if p1 = p2 price region II














q1(p1) ¸ maxfx,0g, q2(p2) ¸ maxf¡x,0g






< = f(p1,p2,x)jq1(p1) ¸ 0, q2(p2) ¸ k, andx = ¡kg. (39)
A.3.2 Proﬁt-maximizing prices in the three price regions
We now solve the optimization problem of the monopolist for each of the three price
regions, and determine whether the ﬁrst-order conditions are necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for a global optimum in each of these regions.





A = (P1(Q1) ¡ cH) ¢ (Q1 ¡ k) + (P2(Q2) ¡ cL) ¢ (Q2 + k)
s.t. Q1 ¸ k, Q2 ¸ 0.
This problem has a concave objective function, and the constraint set is convex.
We therefore know that the ﬁrst-order conditions are suﬃcient conditions for an
equilibrium. Since the feasible set is unbounded, an optimum might not always
exist. The monopolist, however, would never sell a quantity that would drive prices
down below cL. A global optimum thus exists, at least as long as limQ!1 P(Q) < cL.
The monopolist will set the prices p>
1 and p>
2 in regions 1 and 2 that satisfy the













where the prices p>
1H and p>

















It can easily be shown that the price in region 1, p>
1 , decreases in k (as both p>
1H
and pk
1 are decreasing), and that the price p>
2 in region 2 is increasing in k. Hence,
the price in region 1 is below the autarky price in region 1 (p>
1 < pM
1 ), and the price












Subregion 3: S< In subregion 3, the monopolist sets a higher price in the low-
cost region. As a reaction to these decisions by the monopolist, arbitrageurs will
41transport energy from the high-cost region to the low-cost region, and x will become
negative. The monopolist might have the incentive to set such prices when incentives
to price discriminate in favor of the high-cost region are larger than the production-
cost incentives.
The optimization problem in this subregion is similar to that in subregion 1. How-
ever, as electricity ﬂows in the opposite direction, the variable k enters the formula
with the opposite sign. Using a similar argument as before, we can show that the
global optimum exists and that the ﬁrst-order conditions are again necessary and










1 = min(¯ p1,p
<
1H),
where the prices p<
1H and p<

















As before, it can be shown that the price in region 1 p<
1 is increasing in transmission
capacity and that the price p<










Subregion 2: S= In subregion 2, the price diﬀerence ∆p = p1¡p2 is zero, and the
monopolist no longer pays for using the transmission line (∆px = 0). Its objective
function becomes an increasing function of x, and transport increases production
eﬃciencies. It is obvious that the monopolist will never set x < 0, as it would
reduce the monopolist’s objective and would shrink the feasible set. In the optimum,
consumption in region 2 will be positive, as we assume that the reservation price is
suﬃciently large ¯ p2 ¸ pM
1 ¸ pM
2 to prevent shutdown of the market in region 2. The
42monopolist’s optimization problem simpliﬁes to
max
p,x π
A = (p ¡ cH)q1(p) + (p ¡ cL)q2(p) + x∆c
s.t. x · minfq1,kg.
The objective function of the monopolist is concave for prices above the marginal
cost cH, but might be non-concave for prices below the marginal cost cH. Trans-
forming the problem from the price to the quantity domain makes the objective
function concave, but then a new non-convex constraint would have to be introduced
(P1(Q1) = P2(Q2)). A transformation therefore does not convexify the problem, and
several local maxima might exist.
The solution of the problem depends on the size of k, which determines which of the
two constraints will be binding in the optimum. For large transmission capacities




where ptotL is deﬁned in equation 33. For small transmission capacities (k <
q1(ptotL)), transmission capacity will be fully used (x = k) and several local op-





q1(p)(p ¡ cH) + q2(p)(p ¡ cL). (42)
A.3.3 Combining the three regions
The monopolist maximizes his proﬁt by comparing the proﬁts it receives in the three
price regions. He solves his optimization program with respect to the non-convex
constraint set, which consists of a combination of three price regions. In each region
43there might be a local optimum, and when there is no local optimum, then the
supremum is achieved at the price boundary. One of the main assumptions of our
paper is that the autarky price is larger in region 1 than it is in region 2 (pM
1 > pM
2 ).
We show now that under this assumption it is possible to derive conditions on the
existence of local optima, and on the relative proﬁt that the monopolist achieves in
these local optima.
Proposition 7 If a local optimum exists in price region I (p>
1 > p>
2 ), then it is
chosen by the monopolist. If a local optimum does not exist in this region (p>
1 < p>
2 ),
then the monopolist sets a uniform price p= as determined by equation 42.
Proof. The proof consists of ﬁve steps. First, we show that there is no local
optimum in price region III, and that we therefore only need to compare the local
optima in price regions I and II. Second, if p>
1 < p>
2 , then the monopolist will
set a uniform price (p=
1 ,p=
2 ,x=). If p>
1 > p>
2 then a local optimum exists in price
region I, and the monopolist will compare its proﬁt in this local optimum with the
local optimum in price region II. The following steps of the proof will show that
when p>
1 > p>
2 , then this is the global optimum for the monopolist. In the third
step, we show that for a positive price diﬀerence the transmission capacity has to
be small. Fourth, for such small transmission capacities, a monopolist that uses
uniform prices will always congest the line. Fifth, uniform pricing and congesting
the line is dominated by setting a positive price diﬀerence with congested lines.
(1) The autarky price in region 1 is larger than in region 2. According to equation
41, this implies that p<
1 > p<
2 and suggests, therefore, that there is no local optimum
in price region III (by deﬁnition).
(2) If p>
1 < p>
2 , then a local optimum does not exist in price region I (by deﬁnition),
and the monopolist will set a uniform price (p=
1 ,p=
2 ,x=).
44(3) Deﬁne k¤ and p¤










2 ¡ cL) ¡ q2(p¤
2) = k
¤
If the price diﬀerence is positive in price region 1, p>
1 ¡ p>
2 > 0, then k < k¤, as the








2 > p1k ¸ p
>
1 .
The equality follows from the fact that for suﬃciently large reservation prices, p>
2 =
min(p>
2L, ¯ p2). The ﬁrst inequality follows from a comparison of the deﬁnitions for
p>
2L and p¤
2. The second inequality follows from the fact that k > k¤, and that





(4) Above, we showed that for small transmission capacity (k < k¤ < q1(ptotL)) the
monopolist will congest the line (x= = k) in price region II. See equation 42.
(5) If the line is congested (x = k), then the price vector (p>
1 ,p>
2 ) gives the monopolist
a higher proﬁt than any other price combination (p1,p2). This follows from the
deﬁnition of (p>
1 ,p>
2 ). In step 4 we showed that the monopolist will congest the line
when it sets a uniform price (x= = k). This implies that the local proﬁt in price
region I is larger than that in price region II, π(p>
1 ,p>
2 ,x>) ¸ π(p=
1 ,p=
1 ,x=), through
revealed preferences by the monopolist.
A.4 Summary
This subsection combines the results of the previous subsections, and shows that
for suﬃciently low transmission capacities, the optimum is given by the ﬁrst-order
45conditions used in the main text.
Proposition 8 For a small transmission capacity k, the monopolist will set the
prices described by equations 6, 7, 11 and 12.
Proof. The previous subsections described the prices the monopolist will set in
both regimes. For a small transmission capacity and no arbitrage, the monopolist




1H. For this to be the case, demand in
region 1 has to be larger than the transmission capacity, so the line is congested
(condition 1: k · q1(pM
1H)).





when the price diﬀerence between regions 1 and 2 is positive (condition 2: p>
1H >
p>
2L), the price in region 2 is smaller than the reservation price (condition 3: p>
2L <
p2), and the demand in region 1 is larger than the transmission capacity (condition
4: k · q1(p>
1H)).
If transmission capacity is suﬃciently small such that conditions 1 to 4 hold, then
the prices given by equations 6, 7, 11 and 12 deﬁne the global optimum.
Conditions 3 and 4 are never binding, so one only needs to check conditions 1 and
2 which can be written as follows:





2(p)(p ¡ cL) ¡ q2(p) = q
0
1(p)(p ¡ cH) + q1(p).
It can be shown that there exists a positive k that satisﬁes these two conditions.
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